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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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


2. USSR: Vladimir Semichastny appointed new head of KGB; former chief promoted. (*Page iii*)
3. France-Algeria: PAG calls for better treatment of imprisoned rebel leaders as prerequisite to a settlement in Algeria. (*Page iii*)

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USSR: Vladimir Semichastny, the 37-year-old new head of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), like his predecessor is a party careerist without previous experience in intelligence work. Semichastny replaces Aleksandr Shelepin, who was elevated into the top echelon of the leadership when he was made a member of the party secretariat following the 22nd congress last month. The appointment illustrates the party's, and evidently Khrushchev's, continuing control over the secret police network.

Semichastny began his career in the Ukrainian party organization in 1944 and rose to a leading position in the republic youth organization (Komsomol) during the time that Khrushchev headed the Ukrainian party organization. From 1950 to 1958, he and Shelepin served as secretaries of the Komsomol in Moscow. Semichastny succeeded Shelepin as head of the Komsomol in 1958 and as head of the department of the central committee responsible for party personnel appointments the following year.

Semichastny was assigned as party second secretary in Soviet Azerbaydzhan in the summer of 1959, when the republic leadership was under attack for deficiencies in both agriculture and industry. His appointment was in the Kremlin tradition of seeking to remedy local shortcomings by sending in trouble-shooters from Moscow.

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France-Algeria: The 12 November statement by the provisional Algerian government (PAG) calls for French concessions on the treatment accorded rebel vice premier Ben Bella and other imprisoned rebel leaders, now on a hunger strike, as a prerequisite to a settlement of the Algerian problem. The secret talks reportedly have already produced substantial agreement on all other major points. The imprisoned rebels began their hunger strike on 2 November, and reports vary as to the


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DAILY BRIEF

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Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland



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Map Page


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present condition of the prisoners. French officials fear that if Ben Bella should die, negotiations with the PAG would collapse, and restiveness among Moslems in Algeria would increase. (Backup, Page 2)

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Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Nyasaland leader Hastings Banda may soon renew his campaign to pull Nyasaland out of the Federation. It seems likely that Nyasaland's legislature, which is dominated by Banda followers, will pass a strongly anti-Federation resolution shortly after it convenes in the last week of November. Banda told American officials recently that he confidently expects to be in London for constitutional talks in December or January.

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Two years ago, African opposition to the Federation resulted in widespread violence in Nyasaland. Should Banda succeed in leaving the Federation, Britain would also be faced with increased secessionist pressure in Northern Rhodesia.

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French-Algerian Negotiations Jeopardized

A responsible Algerian source has indicated to the US Embassy in Tunis that the PAG protests regarding Ben Bella and the other imprisoned rebel leaders would not affect the secret talks now in progress. The same source added that the prisoners began the hunger strike on their own initiative, but that, since it has spread to thousands of other Algerians held in France, the PAG feels obliged to identify itself with the campaign. Ambassador Walmsley feels that the PAG will not push its protests any further than its internal politics require, but points out that relations between the Tunis-based PAG and the rebel leaders held in France assume increasing importance as a settlement approaches. (In particular, the PAG leaders probably have to decide what use to make of Ben Bella when he is finally released by the French.)

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[An official in the French Ministry of Justice indicated publicly on 12 November that the scope of the hunger strike has been exaggerated. Recent press reports state that the condition of at least some of the rebel leaders is serious, and Ben Bella was removed to a hospital on 13 November. The French claim that only 4,000 Algerian prisoners are involved in the strike, instead of the rumored 15,000. A French Foreign Ministry official told the US Embassy in Paris last week that, although conditions in the prisons where Algerians are held might not be ideal, he felt the hunger strikes were attributable more to political motives and French severity in putting down the Algerian demonstrations in France last month.]

[The PAG representative at the UN, Abdelkader Chanderli, confirmed to US officials on 11 November that "an exchange of questions and answers" has been going on with the French through Swiss intermediaries. Chanderli said agreement had been reached on a citizenship formula which he felt would induce about half of the French now in Algeria to remain after independence. He said that the PAG feels the French have accepted Algerian sovereignty over the Sahara and joint exploitation]

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[redacted] of its resources. He further stated that the question of French military bases in Algeria was still open, and that French forces would not have to leave immediately after independence. Chanderli expects, however, that the anti - De Gaulle Secret Army Organization will revolt against the French Government following a public announcement that "final" negotiations are to begin.

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Nyasaland Agitation for Secession Likely to Increase

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Although Malawi is the best disciplined political organization in the Federation, Banda is not immune to pressure from the party's extremist wing, particularly on the question of the continuance of the Federation. The American resident consul in Nyasaland believes that softness by Banda on the Federation issue is one of the few acts which could lead to his removal.

Malawi disenchantment with the Federation may actually increase unless the pace of constitutional change is stepped up in Northern Rhodesia. The principal Malawi complaint about the Federation is that it is dominated by Southern Rhodesian whites, and British reluctance to go back on the concessions made to Federal Premier Welensky on the Northern Rhodesian issue is regarded by Nyasaland Africans as confirmation of this. Thus, under present circumstances, Malawi leaders are extremely unlikely to modify their stand substantially. In fact, if Banda encounters strong resistance in London or Salisbury, he is likely to authorize Malawi activists to begin a campaign of passive--and occasionally active--resistance to Federal authorities.

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